Decentralization and Democratization in Indonesia

De telephone exchangeization and Democratization in IndonesiaChapter SixLessons and ImplicationsThe changes in Indonesia entertain a bun in the oven been incrementalWe windlessness have the freshly(a) order of battle, or most of it. Anyway, the corrosive parts be still reigning in. We have a new presidency plainly the New Order keeps coming back in various ways.Dwight T. King1It is a problem that, in an era when state seems to have emerged as the single most satis featureory form of presidencyal organization, to a greater extent and more than people in cardinal mature and young democracies ar disengaging from the professorshipial termal do.Knight, Chigudu Tandon (2002)a breakdown of an magisterial regimen may be reversedeven if democracy is established, it need not be consolidated. Under received conditions, parliamentary institutions may systematically generate outcomes that military campaign rough semi semi semi policy-makingly grave forces to opt fo r authoritarianism. Hence, consolidated democracy is tho one among the possible outcomes of breakdown of authoritarian regimes.Pzeworski (1991 51)IntroductionThe discussion in preliminary chapters provides a foundation for important theoretical insights regarding the nature and the significance of decentalisation in Indonesia, as well as its relation to democratization in the regions. I have emphasised how de telephone exchangeisation pr stand forices in the regions promote favorite booking in topical anesthetic disposalal shapees beyond electoral troth.By and large, the buzz offs of Bandung territory and metropolis of Cirebon in implementing decentalisation between 1945 and 2006 lend support to the argument that decentralization does not necessarily lead to the growth of topical anaesthetic anaesthetic democracy within which topical anesthetic anaesthetic ordinary bicycle people are able to exert their strength to heartyly influence local decision-making process. Although promoting democracy has become one of the assertd goals of several decentralization laws, their enforcement in twain regions has not promoted symboliseingful inclusion of local ordinary people in local semi governmental processes beyond electoral participation. In event, it has been the sickest stain of decentralization practices in both regions. Overall, the two case studies share a homogeneous theme, namely that power be rattling concentrated in the detention of local elites and hence, local communities are constantly marginalized. Against this backdrop, in this chapter, I go forthing examine a number of agents which have circumscribed the parliamentary say-so of the decentralization program in Indonesia.Based on the experiences of a variety of countries, more or less theorists suggest that successful decentralization policies are contingent upon certain individual or collective prerequisites. These include a high degree of central express capac ity, a well finded civil society, sanitary governmental will among home(a) as well as local policy-making elites, strong neighborly support, a long experience of democracy, a well-established multi-party system, strong enabling heavy frameworks, and a culture of accountability, etc (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989 77-78 Crook Manor 1995 327 Ardaya Thevoz 2001 220 Heller 2001 138-139). Regarding this assertion, analysts similarly emphasize that the b assigninus to which these conditions work varies crosswise countries. This means that some conditions work relatively well in certain countries, only if in others they do not strongly palliate the stated goals of decentralization policies (Kulipossa 2004 771). In addition, smoke (2003 12) and Kulipossa (2004 772) also draw attention to the fact that in that location are cases where decentralization can achieve its potential drop benefits in the absence of those conditions, as well as cases where most of those prere quisites are in place, but decentralization has been undermined.Against the in a higher place bankers bill of thought, I would argue here that to a certain extent, the unsuccessful democratic potential of decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon can also be associated with the absence of some of the above favourable conditions. These include weak political will among both case and local political government, the absence of a vibrant civil society, and the miss of an attentive normal. needless to say, these factors vary across time and regimes. Above all, the absence of these favourable conditions for fulfilling the democratic potential of decentralization appears to work from three aspects first, all along, decentralization in Indonesia has been perceived and conjoind by Indonesian political elites mainly as a matter of political strategy second, the long-standing authoritarian system of governing body and third, the primacy of pragmatic over political decentral ization approach, both normatively and empirically.Decentralization in Indonesia a matter of regimes political strategy?Among the most important factors which determines the design and the actual practices of decentralization and in turn, its expected consequences (e.g., improving overt benefit salvagey, maintaining national integration and promoting local democracy) is the motivation of appoint actors in adopting the insurance in the first place (Selee Tulchin 2004). The experiences of umpteen developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, for instance, attest that the motives of politicians that embrace decentralization policies are not necessarily as double-dyed(a) as those who design them. In fact, rat and Gomez (2006 351 see also, for example, Eaton 2001a Shah Thompson 2004 3-4) observe that notwithstanding the efficiency and good governance rhetoric surrounding decentralization, the underlying impetus has been inherently political, meaning that the adoptio n of decentralization has been linked to central governments desire to perform their own particular political interests. The factors underlying political interest are realm and regime specific. They include, for instance, shoring up their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens usually amidst national political crisis, competition with rival political parties for popular support, pressure from subnational governments for more powers, and opportunity for a ruling party to consolidate power (Selee Tulchin 2004 299-302 Smoke Gomez 2006 351). M some(prenominal) observers believe that these kinds of political motives have partly accounted for the failure of decentralization practices in m each developing countries to deliver its democratic potential (Eaton 2001a Friedman Kihato 2004 Oxhorn 2004).Indonesias decentralization experience is not an exception to the above phenomenon. Although promoting democratization has been one of the stated goals of Indonesias decentralization programs, in that respect has been significant gap between rhetoric and reality. The continuous marginalization of local people from local political processes has been partly grow in the undemocratic political motives of both national and local political elites in adopting and implementing decentralization policy. As explained in Chapter Three, decentralization in Indonesia has never been constructed in a political vacuum. Hence, I would argue that the degree, pattern and process of decentralization has been strongly influenced by, borrowing Montero and Samuels term (2004 5), political epitopes, i.e., regime responses to changing conditions and incentives within the context of rapid political and sparing changes.During the revolution era, decentralization policies recognized the principle of gigantic autonomy in all regions of the newly independent state. However, much(prenominal) policies were real constructed by national political elites as a means of establishing and maintaining na tional authority over more already operating local governments in those regions preliminaryly occupied by the compound government. The polices were also constructed to fulfill other political ends, namely to gain supranational recognition, as contained in both equity nary(prenominal) 1 of 1945 and zero(prenominal) 22 of 1948 in the face of Dutch accusations that Indonesia was a puppet state of the Japanese. Thus, patronage official claims that decentralization was embraced as an indispensable strategy in materializing a democratic system due to the terra firmas size and diverse characteristics, the embrace of the policy during this end was not genuinely relate to the intention of developing meaningful democratic system within the country since those two basic laws were not followed by any clear in operation(p) assumeions whatsoever on how a democratic system of government would be crafted on the ground. This claim is underscored by the fact that there was no significant a lteration in terms of local political processes in Bandung, Cirebon or other regions in the country. As Maryanov (1958 9) also observed,Many of the institutions and practices adopt or utilized by independent Indonesia have been reflections of those established by the Netherlands East Indiesalterations in governmental structure turned out to be minorpatterns of administrative behavior remained rooted in the Dutch traditional procedures.Accordingly, the experiences of both Bandung and Cirebon during post-independence until mid fifties revea lead that, except for the establishment of local government structures, the enforcement of Law nary(prenominal) 1 of 1945 and no 22 of 1948 allowed neither good decentralization nor democratization in the regions. Needless to say, the political situation during revolutionary era also contributed to the limited enforcement of the policies in the regions.By the same token, there were three decisive political factors which led national political elites to adopt advanced decentralization policy as contained in Law no. 1 of 1957 which greatly increased the power of elected legislative councils in the provinces, regencies, and municipalities and set for wider regional authority vis--vis the central government (Feith 1962 552). These factors were, first, a kind of political promise by the government of Republic of Indonesia to the former parting states of the Republic of the United States of Indonesiaa federal structure created by the Dutch when they voluntarily decided to join the Republic of Indonesia to establish the one(a) State of the Republic of Indonesia. Second, the electoral calculations of various political parties in the contribution Assembly to have wider mass bases in the regions and to play more influential roles in regional politics. And third, forbid regional rebellions rooted in growing regional dissatisfaction concerning the central governments unfulfilled promises to carry out study. This was intertwined with other identification numbers such(prenominal) as ethnic tension, scotch instability and political rivalry between politicians in Java and the Outer Islands. Accordingly, most of the advanced comestible within Law No. 1 were considered to be nimble responses to the above political factors, such as the recognition of the principle of extensive autonomy which was applied base on the capacity of respective local governments and the choice of headlands of regions by the DPRDs. In addition, the direct pick of members of the DPRD and the issue of Indonesias first fiscal Balance Law within the same year were also seen as native efforts by national political elites to respond to those political factors.In turn, however, similar to its predecessors, such pragmatic and short term political calculations by national political elites prevented decentralization achieving its idealized outcomes. As Bandung and Cirebons experiences attest, until late 1950s, there was relatively shr impy effective power actually decentralized. In addition, one world power conclude that with the entree of direct choice of DPRD members and the election of head of region by the DPRD, local democracy was being crafted on the ground. However, it was not accompanied by channels of popular participation beyond the election. Recapping the above political motives in adopting such advances provides in Law No. 1, neither central government policy makers nor democratically elected local governments in either case study considered this issue as among their political goals. Accordingly, the two case studies demonstrate that the dynamic of political parties and decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon clearly did not make local political process more open to participation by local people.Decentralization practices during the Sukarno and Suharto eras obviously con blind drunk the argument that decentralization can be applied within authoritarian regime (Eaton 2001a 3 Montero Samu els 2004 10). These cases, however, it was by no means aimed at achieving the various virtues routinely discussed by democratization theorists, but rather at tightening their curtail over the apparatus of local government at all levels in order to facilitate an authoritarian system. This was particularly fulfilled by making both subnational executives and legislatures appointed and hence, accountable to the national authorities. Thus, these local apparatus were postcode but the instruments of central government with their main function representing the central governments interests in the regions.Yet again, such decentralization was not made in a political vacuum. Prior to the enforcement of presidential rewrite No. 6 of 1959 concerning Regional regimen and Presidential Edict No. 5 of 1960 regarding the Gotong Royong Regional Representative Council and Regional Secretariat (Sekretaris Daerah), Indonesia was hit by escalating political turmoil due to the outbreak of rebellions i n Sumatra and Sulawesi, the repeated contribute of governing coalitions at the national level in addition to the failure of the Constituent Assembly to make a replacement for the Provisional 1950 Constitution. In turn, these aspects triggered the issuance of a wave of government canons by Sukarno intended to overhaul the system of government based on his personal pattern of Guided Democracya democracy with a leadership(van der Kroef 1957 115). This concept was believed to be an alternative to troublesome westward concepts of parliamentary democracy which had supposedly led to the above political turbulence due to the weakness of government authority and the excitement of political opposition (van der Kroef 1957 113). Thus, the new arrangements in local governance were specifically aimed at facilitating Sukarnos own concept of Guided Democracy, which required a total subservience of local governments to central government policies. Sukarno himself was closely involved in setting in place local government institutions, such as heads of regions and local councils.Suharto did not loosen up central mastery when he took over from Sukarno following the abortive conspiracy by left-wing officers in 1965 until his demise in 1998 (Malley 1999 75). In fact, severe economic and political crisis inherited from the previous regime contributed to the deepening of authoritarianism that fostered a super centralized system of government. Suhartos regime believed that this mode of government could retain political and economic stability as its ultimate basis for overcoming the crisis. Another important determinant of Suhartos centralistic policy towards local government system was the need to establish and consolidate an effective government administration over the vast and diverse country (MacAndrews 1986 27-30). In turn, these variables contributed to the centralistic nature of New Orders decentralization lawLaw No. 5 of 1974 concerning The Basic Principle of disposal in the Regional Government through which the regions had neither influence over national government policies nor the power to obligate their own affairs (Aspinall Fealy 2003 2). In essence, throughout Suhartos regime, local governments were mainly as implementers of various policies constructed and financially supported by the central government.Thus, both the Sukarno and Suharto regime thence broodd to adopt decentralization policies as represented by the population of the above law and regulations. However, all were intended to facilitate central government control and greater penetration of society in order to repress vehemence political opposition so that all central government policies and interests would be expeditiously implemented down to the lowest level of governments without any resistance. Needless to say, such a mode of decentralization provided no space for citizen participation.Many Indonesians had great hopes that the questionable Big Bang approach to decentral ization launched in 2001 would at become bring into reality the various potential benefits of the policy, including democratic local governance. However, various studies (e.g., Anggraini 2007 The Asia Foundation, 2002a The Asia Foundation, 2002b Wardana 2007) including two case studies discussed in previous chapters attend that the decentralization practices have gone(p) without meaningful opening up institutional spaces for greater citizen participation, even though, promoting local democratic governance was among the stated goals of the Big Bang approach.Yet again, a key problem was that realizing democratic potential was not among the main goals of the national political elites when they adopted the policy. Rather, as explained in Chapter Three, the Big Bang policy was motivated by a number of crucial political determinants that had little to do with developing local democracy or even with the neo-liberal agenda of achieving a more effective and efficient public service. Thes e included forestalling national disintegration amidst the emergence of breakaway movements and the vocal demands for more autonomy from some resource-rich regions (Sukma 2003 65 Hidayat Antlov 2004 271 Hofman Kaiser 2004 17) restoring the legitimacy of the state as well as national elites following the collapse of Suhartos regime, severe economic crisis, and the loss of East Timor (Smoke Gomez 2006 353) transferring financial burdens from the center to the regions amidst dramatic decline of central governments financial capacity following the economic crisis of 1997-1999 (Hidayat Antlov 2004 271-272) and, no less important, electoral calculus of Habibies to garner the support of the regions prior to the presidential elections (Hofman Kaiser 2004 17). It was for these strategic reasons, few of which were related to democracy, that the government was willing to embrace a radical approach to decentralization. Further consequence, as attested in Bandung District and City of Ci rebon cases, neither clear and firm central governments policies or programs, nor local governance meaningfully accommodated the rhetoric of promoting democratization into reality. Although it was practically argued that local democracy was clevernessened through the significant empowerment of DPRD vis--vis head of region (Rasyid 2003), this mechanism of political representation in fact could not deliver effective accomplishment of what Fung and Wright (2003 3) called,the central ideas of democratic politics facilitating agile political involvement of the citizenry, forging political consensus through dialogue, devising and implementing public policies that ground a productive economy and healthy society, and, in more radical egalitarian versions of the democratic ideal, assuring that all citizens benefit from the nations wealth.The enforcement of Indonesias current decentralization lawLaw No. 32 of 2004did not make local political processes more inclusive either, since the law was not motivated by the intention to so. On the surface, it efficacy appear that the formulation of the law was driven by the intention of the Megawati administration to curb the emergence of various abuses of Law No. 22 of 1999, such as rampant corruption and blatant money politics, ethnic parochialism, and the proliferation of excessive taxes which had led to a high cost economy to name some of the most disturbing signs. Many perceived that all of these problems were rooted in imperfect laws and the lack of a clearly designed plan (Turner et al. 2003 Legowo 2003 Legowo Djadijono n.d).More compelling is the argument that the assay was a straightforward act of re-centralization. Such an act is particularly rooted in the nature of decentralization itself, which is not merely as an administrative business, but rather it involves the distributional struggles between national and subnational elites regarding control over local resources (Slater Watson 1989 511 Montero 2001 44-45 H adiz 2003b 123). Accordingly, meaningful decentralization always faces enormous political obstacles and can be subjected to dangerous setbacks. One of the salient challenges is the preference of national elites to slow down the process of decentralization and to reinforce their attempts to control it. As Eaton (2001b 102) suggests, national politicians can and do continue to use their legislative authority to modify the initial decision to decentralize. Thus, for national politicians, decentralization is neither inevitable nor irreversible (Eaton 2001b 101). I would suggest that the enforcement of the latest Indonesias decentralization lawLaw No. 32 of 2004perfectly supports this line of argument. This contention is further strengthened by the fact that Law No. 32 restores and strengthens the province and the Ministry of Home Affairs positions in regional affairs at the expense of district governments authority (Eko 2005 27-29 Ryaas Rashid as cited in Myala 2005).The only new provi sion within Law No. 32 of 2004 embraced by some as a significant leap in decentralization and local democratization efforts regarded the direct election of heads of regions However, as Fung and Wright argues (2003 3), the election of both legislative and executive offices are not decent to accommodate the influence of local ordinary people on local political processes beyond the election. As the experiences of Bandung and Cirebon attest, there has not been any significant alteration in terms of developing inclusive local political process in the aftermath of the head of region elections. It must be admitted that the promulgation of Local canon on Transparency and Participation in Bandung District in 2004 was actually a progressive step in institutionalizing active political involvement of local people. However, it has not been effectively implemented yet. Lack of political will on the part of local to consistently implement the regulation has ensured that it has had only rhetori cal value. The claim that popular participation has been channeled through the annual development planning process is specious, since the process is actually still strongly predominate by local government officers.New arrangements in local governance based on Law No. 32 have in fact significantly reduced the power of DPRDs vis--vis heads of regions, since the former no longer have the power to elect and to hold the latter accountable, as regulated in the previous decentralization law. The head of region is now accountable to the central authorities with the president at the apex of the hierarchy. Thus, from a representative democracy point of view, there has been a significant retreat as well.Thus, the lesson seems to be that decentralization in Indonesia has been pursue mainly as a political strategy to fulfill certain political ends, particularly those of national elites within the context of political and economic crisis. increase democracy has never been the driving force beh ind decentralization reform. It is consequently no surprise that we find a lack of political will to realize the democratic potential of decentralization policies at any stage of Indonesias history. Smoke (2003 12) points out that among the most ubiquitous claims regarding impediments to decentralizations success is the lack of strong political will from various stakeholders involved in the process. Theorists do not all mean the same thing when they talk about political will. For some theorists, strong political will can be seen from the existence of constitutional or legal instruments made by political elites, both national and local (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989 77-78 Smoke 2003 12). Nevertheless, since many cases also show that decentralization policies cannot attain their intended goals,2 theorists also emphasize that constitutional and legal instruments are not sufficient to ensure workable decentralization policies. As Isaac (2001 9) firmly argues,Fundamental reforms cannot be merely legislated. Legislation remains empty phrases unless powerful movements oversee their implementation. Legislation is necessary but not sufficient for decentralization.Accordingly, as Rondinelli (1983 198-200) highlights, political will must also be measurable from the actual realization of those normative arrangements particularly by central political authorities transferring planning, decision-making and managerial authority to lower levels of governments, and also by local political authorities sharing their authority with local citizens through opening up effective channels for political participation so that local citizens, especially the execrable and marginalized ones, are able to express their needs and demands and to press claims or national and local development resources. Thus, this dimension of political will is also essential, since in many cases, normative arrangements of decentralization are often used to facilitate political aims that have little to do with devolving power to lower level of governments and utilizing this power to effectively fulfill local peoples needs and demands. As Crook (2003 85-86) stresses, in some African countries the real goal is often to consolidate power through political parties and local elites, or to deliberately neutralize local ethnic challenges through fragmenting potential local power bases into smaller, weaker, politically insignificant units.Based on the above line of thought, the lack of political will in pursuing the democratic potential of Indonesias decentralization can be viewed from different perspectives. Normatively, even though the embrace of the policy may initially be claimed to be an indispensable strategy to develop a democratic system of government, its subsequent adoption within constitutions and some existing decentralization laws as well as their operational regulations in the regions so far has never been clear, firm, and consistent. Neither constitutions nor basic legisla tion and its subsequent operational regulations explicitly note that promoting local democracy is among the intended goals of decentralization programs. During the New Order era, Development Planning (Perencanaan Pembangunan), which was regulated within the Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation of 1982 (Permendagri No. 9/1982), was claimed to be adopting a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Empirically, however, as proven in the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon, the planning process was actually highly centralized and practically excluded public participation. The local governments development planning processes were nothing but breaking down the centrally planned parameters.One might find that this was not the case during the post-Suharto era, particularly with regard to Law No.22 of 1999 and Law No. 32 of 2004. Indeed, some argue that Law No. 22 in particular, was intended to promote local democracy and participation, as evident in its preamble in t he implementation of Regional Autonomy is deemed to be necessary to emphasize more the principles of democracy, public participation, exist distribution and fairness, and considering the potential and regional diversity (Turner et al. 2003 23 see also, Jaya Dick 2001 216). However, it appears that further details on how local democracy would be implemented on the ground were actually ill-defined.The national government in fact issued a separate regulation, i.e. Government Regulation No. 68 of 1999 regarding public participation in the governmental process.3 From the title of the regulation, one might slow assume that it was regarding peoples involvement in the governments policy-making process. But, it was actually not. The regulation was actually more about peoples rights rather than facilitating popular participation. Four rights were mentioned the right to obtain and give information regarding governmental process the right to get fair service from the government the right to give advice to the government policies and the right to legal protection (perlindungan hukum).4 Thus, the Government Regulation did not specifically mention that popular participation would be the essential component of the government policy-making process. In addition, knowing that popular participation was framed in terms of rights, it means that it was set on willing basis. I believe that such setting provided weak encouragement for the public to be engaged in governmental process.In the case of Law No. 32, its prologue reads,local government, which manages and oversees its own governmental affairs based on the principles of decentralization and medebewind (co-operating administration) , is order towards boosting people welfare through service improvement, empowerment, and popular participation, as well as improving regional competitiveness by taking into account the principles of democracy, equal distribution, fairness, specialness (keistimewaan), and specific characteristics (kekhususan) of a region within the system of Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia.From the above prologue, there would appear to be no significant difference between Law No. 22 and Law No. 32. However, one might argue that central government, as the main architect of the law, showed stronger political will to uphold local democracy in Law No. 32 rather than its predecessor, based on two original articles within the law, i.e. word 56 (1) regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government and Article 139 (1) which stated that Local community has the right to provide enter verbally or in writing for the preparation of or during the slowness of a proposed bill. Direct election of head and deputy head of local government is undeniably desirable since, as Peterson (1997 14) argues, indirect elections have tended to perpetuate the strength of political insiders, who are often more accountable to their party hierarchy than to the public at large. Nevertheless, further analysis of other articles reveals that direct election of head and deputy head of local government actually lacked democratic penchant in three aspects first, the election process was practically dominated by political parties maneuvers, especially during the selection of the candidates for head and deputy head of local government, which is disposed to power abuse by selling the office to the highest bidder second, there was strong intervention from national political party boards in determining the candidates and third, the election gave no opportunity for independent candidates (Legowo Djadijono n.d). Hence, in the end, local communities have become the remnant component in the whole series of the election process. In other words, the novel provide regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government only left the local community marginalized.More importantly, direct election is insufficient for developing strong local democracy since elections o ccur infrequently and allow for only limited citizen input or feedback regarding specific local concerns or policy options (Posner 2004 57). Strong local democracy, Posner argues, needs to be backed up by active political participation of local constituencies beyond the mere act of voting.With regard to Article 139 (1), it appears that popular participation was provided for on a voluntarily basis. What I am pointing out here is that the article indicates that popular participation in local policy making process was not an essential factor in the process. This point is underlined by the fact that there were no other provisions within Law No. 32 which obligated local government institutions to engage the local community meaningfully in the process.Decentralization and Democratization in IndonesiaDecentralization and Democratization in IndonesiaChapter SixLessons and ImplicationsThe changes in Indonesia have been incrementalWe still have the New Order, or most of it. Anyway, the corros ive parts are still reigning in. We have a new administration but the New Order keeps coming back in various ways.Dwight T. King1It is a paradox that, in an era when democracy seems to have emerged as the single most acceptable form of political organization, more and more people in both mature and young democracies are disengaging from the political process.Knight, Chigudu Tandon (2002)a breakdown of an authoritarian regime may be reversedeven if democracy is established, it need not be consolidated. Under certain conditions, democratic institutions may systematically generate outcomes that cause some politically important forces to opt for authoritarianism. Hence, consolidated democracy is only one among the possible outcomes of breakdown of authoritarian regimes.Pzeworski (1991 51)IntroductionThe discussion in previous chapters provides a foundation for important theoretical insights regarding the nature and the significance of decentralization in Indonesia, as well as its relat ion to democratization in the regions. I have emphasized how decentralization practices in the regions promote popular participation in local political processes beyond electoral participation.By and large, the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon in implementing decentralization between 1945 and 2006 lend support to the argument that decentralization does not necessarily lead to the growth of local democracy within which local ordinary people are able to exert their power to significantly influence local decision-making process. Although promoting democracy has become one of the stated goals of several decentralization laws, their enforcement in both regions has not promoted meaningful inclusion of local ordinary people in local political processes beyond electoral participation. In fact, it has been the weakest point of decentralization practices in both regions. Overall, the two case studies share a similar theme, namely that power remains actually concentrated in the hands of local elites and hence, local communities are constantly marginalized. Against this backdrop, in this chapter, I will examine a number of factors which have circumscribed the democratic potential of the decentralization program in Indonesia.Based on the experiences of a variety of countries, some theorists suggest that successful decentralization policies are contingent upon certain individual or collective prerequisites. These include a high degree of central state capacity, a well developed civil society, strong political will among national as well as local political elites, strong social support, a long experience of democracy, a well-established multi-party system, strong enabling legal frameworks, and a culture of accountability, etc (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989 77-78 Crook Manor 1995 327 Ardaya Thevoz 2001 220 Heller 2001 138-139). Regarding this assertion, analysts also emphasize that the extent to which these conditions work varies across countries. This means that some conditions work relatively well in certain countries, but in others they do not effectively facilitate the stated goals of decentralization policies (Kulipossa 2004 771). In addition, Smoke (2003 12) and Kulipossa (2004 772) also draw attention to the fact that there are cases where decentralization can achieve its potential benefits in the absence of those conditions, as well as cases where most of those prerequisites are in place, but decentralization has been undermined.Against the above line of thought, I would argue here that to a certain extent, the unfulfilled democratic potential of decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon can also be associated with the absence of some of the above favourable conditions. These include weak political will among both national and local political authorities, the absence of a vibrant civil society, and the lack of an attentive public. Needless to say, these factors vary across time and regimes. Above all, the abse nce of these favourable conditions for fulfilling the democratic potential of decentralization appears to result from three aspects first, all along, decentralization in Indonesia has been perceived and embraced by Indonesian political elites mainly as a matter of political strategy second, the long-standing authoritarian system of government and third, the primacy of pragmatic over political decentralization approach, both normatively and empirically.Decentralization in Indonesia a matter of regimes political strategy?Among the most important factors which determines the design and the actual practices of decentralization and in turn, its expected consequences (e.g., improving public service delivery, maintaining national integration and promoting local democracy) is the motivation of key actors in adopting the policy in the first place (Selee Tulchin 2004). The experiences of many developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, for instance, attest that the motives of po liticians that embrace decentralization policies are not necessarily as virtuous as those who design them. In fact, Smoke and Gomez (2006 351 see also, for example, Eaton 2001a Shah Thompson 2004 3-4) observe that despite the efficiency and good governance rhetoric surrounding decentralization, the underlying impetus has been inherently political, meaning that the adoption of decentralization has been linked to central governments desire to accomplish their own particular political interests. The factors underlying political interest are country and regime specific. They include, for instance, shoring up their legitimacy in the eyes of citizens usually amidst national political crisis, competition with rival political parties for popular support, pressure from subnational governments for more powers, and opportunity for a ruling party to consolidate power (Selee Tulchin 2004 299-302 Smoke Gomez 2006 351). Many observers believe that these kinds of political motives have partly accounted for the failure of decentralization practices in many developing countries to deliver its democratic potential (Eaton 2001a Friedman Kihato 2004 Oxhorn 2004).Indonesias decentralization experience is not an exception to the above phenomenon. Although promoting democratization has been one of the stated goals of Indonesias decentralization programs, there has been significant gap between rhetoric and reality. The continuous marginalization of local people from local political processes has been partly rooted in the undemocratic political motives of both national and local political elites in adopting and implementing decentralization policy. As explained in Chapter Three, decentralization in Indonesia has never been constructed in a political vacuum. Hence, I would argue that the degree, pattern and process of decentralization has been strongly influenced by, borrowing Montero and Samuels term (2004 5), political determinants, i.e., regime responses to changing conditions and incentives within the context of rapid political and economic changes.During the revolution era, decentralization policies recognized the principle of extensive autonomy in all regions of the newly independent Republic. However, such policies were actually constructed by national political elites as a means of establishing and maintaining national authority over many already operating local governments in those regions previously occupied by the colonial government. The polices were also constructed to fulfill other political ends, namely to gain international recognition, as contained in both Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 in the face of Dutch accusations that Indonesia was a puppet state of the Japanese. Thus, despite official claims that decentralization was embraced as an indispensable strategy in materializing a democratic system due to the countrys size and diverse characteristics, the embrace of the policy during this period was not genuinely related to the intentio n of developing meaningful democratic system within the country since those two basic laws were not followed by any clear operational directions whatsoever on how a democratic system of government would be crafted on the ground. This claim is underscored by the fact that there was no significant alteration in terms of local political processes in Bandung, Cirebon or other regions in the country. As Maryanov (1958 9) also observed,Many of the institutions and practices adopted or utilized by independent Indonesia have been reflections of those established by the Netherlands East Indiesalterations in governmental structure turned out to be minorpatterns of administrative behavior remained rooted in the Dutch traditional procedures.Accordingly, the experiences of both Bandung and Cirebon during post-independence until mid 1950s revealed that, except for the establishment of local government structures, the enforcement of Law No. 1 of 1945 and No. 22 of 1948 allowed neither effective de centralization nor democratization in the regions. Needless to say, the political situation during revolutionary era also contributed to the limited enforcement of the policies in the regions.By the same token, there were three decisive political factors which led national political elites to adopt advanced decentralization policy as contained in Law No. 1 of 1957 which greatly increased the power of elected legislative councils in the provinces, regencies, and municipalities and set for wider regional authority vis--vis the central government (Feith 1962 552). These factors were, first, a kind of political promise by the government of Republic of Indonesia to the former constituent states of the Republic of the United States of Indonesiaa federal structure created by the Dutch when they voluntarily decided to join the Republic of Indonesia to establish the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Second, the electoral calculations of various political parties in the Constituent Assembly to have wider mass bases in the regions and to play more influential roles in regional politics. And third, forestalling regional rebellions rooted in growing regional dissatisfaction concerning the central governments unfulfilled promises to carry out development. This was intertwined with other issues such as ethnic tension, economic imbalance and political rivalry between politicians in Java and the Outer Islands. Accordingly, most of the advanced provisions within Law No. 1 were considered to be immediate responses to the above political factors, such as the recognition of the principle of extensive autonomy which was applied based on the capacity of respective local governments and the election of heads of regions by the DPRDs. In addition, the direct election of members of the DPRD and the issuance of Indonesias first Fiscal Balance Law within the same year were also seen as inseparable efforts by national political elites to respond to those political factors.In turn , however, similar to its predecessors, such pragmatic and short term political calculations by national political elites prevented decentralization achieving its idealized outcomes. As Bandung and Cirebons experiences attest, until late 1950s, there was relatively little effective power actually decentralized. In addition, one might conclude that with the introduction of direct election of DPRD members and the election of head of region by the DPRD, local democracy was being crafted on the ground. However, it was not accompanied by channels of popular participation beyond the election. Recapping the above political motives in adopting such advances provisions in Law No. 1, neither central government policy makers nor democratically elected local governments in either case study considered this issue as among their political goals. Accordingly, the two case studies demonstrate that the dynamic of political parties and decentralization practices in Bandung and Cirebon clearly did not make local political process more open to participation by local people.Decentralization practices during the Sukarno and Suharto eras obviously confirm the argument that decentralization can be applied within authoritarian regime (Eaton 2001a 3 Montero Samuels 2004 10). These cases, however, it was by no means aimed at achieving the various virtues routinely discussed by democratization theorists, but rather at tightening their control over the apparatus of local government at all levels in order to facilitate an authoritarian system. This was particularly fulfilled by making both subnational executives and legislatures appointed and hence, accountable to the national authorities. Thus, these local apparatus were nothing but the instruments of central government with their main function representing the central governments interests in the regions.Yet again, such decentralization was not made in a political vacuum. Prior to the enforcement of Presidential Edict No. 6 of 1959 conc erning Regional Government and Presidential Edict No. 5 of 1960 regarding the Gotong Royong Regional Representative Council and Regional Secretariat (Sekretaris Daerah), Indonesia was hit by escalating political turbulence due to the outbreak of rebellions in Sumatra and Sulawesi, the repeated collapse of governing coalitions at the national level in addition to the failure of the Constituent Assembly to make a replacement for the Provisional 1950 Constitution. In turn, these aspects triggered the issuance of a wave of government regulations by Sukarno intended to overhaul the system of government based on his personal concept of Guided Democracya democracy with a leadership(van der Kroef 1957 115). This concept was believed to be an alternative to troublesome Western concepts of parliamentary democracy which had supposedly led to the above political turbulence due to the weakness of government authority and the vehemence of political opposition (van der Kroef 1957 113). Thus, the n ew arrangements in local governance were specifically aimed at facilitating Sukarnos own concept of Guided Democracy, which required a total subservience of local governments to central government policies. Sukarno himself was closely involved in setting in place local government institutions, such as heads of regions and local councils.Suharto did not loosen up central control when he took over from Sukarno following the abortive conspiracy by left-wing officers in 1965 until his demise in 1998 (Malley 1999 75). In fact, severe economic and political crisis inherited from the previous regime contributed to the deepening of authoritarianism that fostered a highly centralized system of government. Suhartos regime believed that this mode of government could retain political and economic stability as its ultimate basis for overcoming the crisis. Another important determinant of Suhartos centralistic policy towards local government system was the need to establish and consolidate an eff ective government administration over the vast and diverse country (MacAndrews 1986 27-30). In turn, these variables contributed to the centralistic nature of New Orders decentralization lawLaw No. 5 of 1974 concerning The Basic Principle of Government in the Regional Government through which the regions had neither influence over national government policies nor the power to control their own affairs (Aspinall Fealy 2003 2). In essence, throughout Suhartos regime, local governments were mainly as implementers of various policies constructed and financially supported by the central government.Thus, both the Sukarno and Suharto regime indeed continued to adopt decentralization policies as represented by the existence of the above law and regulations. However, all were intended to facilitate central government control and greater penetration of society in order to repress vehemence political opposition so that all central government policies and interests would be efficiently impleme nted down to the lowest level of governments without any resistance. Needless to say, such a mode of decentralization provided no space for citizen participation.Many Indonesians had great hopes that the so-called Big Bang approach to decentralization launched in 2001 would at last bring into reality the various potential benefits of the policy, including democratic local governance. However, various studies (e.g., Anggraini 2007 The Asia Foundation, 2002a The Asia Foundation, 2002b Wardana 2007) including two case studies discussed in previous chapters confirm that the decentralization practices have gone without meaningful opening up institutional spaces for greater citizen participation, even though, promoting local democratic governance was among the stated goals of the Big Bang approach.Yet again, a key problem was that realizing democratic potential was not among the main goals of the national political elites when they adopted the policy. Rather, as explained in Chapter Three , the Big Bang policy was motivated by a number of crucial political determinants that had little to do with developing local democracy or even with the neo-liberal agenda of achieving a more effective and efficient public service. These included forestalling national disintegration amidst the emergence of separatist movements and the vocal demands for more autonomy from some resource-rich regions (Sukma 2003 65 Hidayat Antlov 2004 271 Hofman Kaiser 2004 17) restoring the legitimacy of the state as well as national elites following the collapse of Suhartos regime, severe economic crisis, and the loss of East Timor (Smoke Gomez 2006 353) transferring financial burdens from the center to the regions amidst dramatic decline of central governments financial capacity following the economic crisis of 1997-1999 (Hidayat Antlov 2004 271-272) and, no less important, electoral calculus of Habibies to garner the support of the regions prior to the presidential elections (Hofman Kaiser 2 004 17). It was for these strategic reasons, few of which were related to democracy, that the government was willing to embrace a radical approach to decentralization. Further consequence, as attested in Bandung District and City of Cirebon cases, neither clear and firm central governments policies or programs, nor local governance meaningfully accommodated the rhetoric of promoting democratization into reality. Although it was often argued that local democracy was strengthened through the significant empowerment of DPRD vis--vis head of region (Rasyid 2003), this mechanism of political representation in fact could not deliver effective accomplishment of what Fung and Wright (2003 3) called,the central ideas of democratic politics facilitating active political involvement of the citizenry, forging political consensus through dialogue, devising and implementing public policies that ground a productive economy and healthy society, and, in more radical egalitarian versions of the democ ratic ideal, assuring that all citizens benefit from the nations wealth.The enforcement of Indonesias latest decentralization lawLaw No. 32 of 2004did not make local political processes more inclusive either, since the law was not motivated by the intention to so. On the surface, it might appear that the formulation of the law was driven by the intention of the Megawati administration to curb the emergence of various abuses of Law No. 22 of 1999, such as rampant corruption and blatant money politics, ethnic parochialism, and the proliferation of excessive taxes which had led to a high cost economy to name some of the most worrying signs. Many perceived that all of these problems were rooted in imperfect laws and the lack of a clearly designed plan (Turner et al. 2003 Legowo 2003 Legowo Djadijono n.d).More compelling is the argument that the attempt was a straightforward act of re-centralization. Such an act is particularly rooted in the nature of decentralization itself, which is n ot merely as an administrative business, but rather it involves the distributional struggles between national and subnational elites regarding control over local resources (Slater Watson 1989 511 Montero 2001 44-45 Hadiz 2003b 123). Accordingly, meaningful decentralization always faces enormous political obstacles and can be subjected to serious setbacks. One of the salient challenges is the preference of national elites to slow down the process of decentralization and to reinforce their attempts to control it. As Eaton (2001b 102) suggests, national politicians can and do continue to use their legislative authority to modify the initial decision to decentralize. Thus, for national politicians, decentralization is neither inevitable nor irreversible (Eaton 2001b 101). I would suggest that the enforcement of the latest Indonesias decentralization lawLaw No. 32 of 2004perfectly supports this line of argument. This contention is further strengthened by the fact that Law No. 32 restore s and strengthens the province and the Ministry of Home Affairs positions in regional affairs at the expense of district governments authority (Eko 2005 27-29 Ryaas Rashid as cited in Myala 2005).The only new provision within Law No. 32 of 2004 embraced by many as a significant leap in decentralization and local democratization efforts regarded the direct election of heads of regions However, as Fung and Wright argues (2003 3), the election of both legislative and executive offices are not sufficient to accommodate the influence of local ordinary people on local political processes beyond the election. As the experiences of Bandung and Cirebon attest, there has not been any significant alteration in terms of developing inclusive local political process in the aftermath of the head of region elections. It must be admitted that the promulgation of Local Regulation on Transparency and Participation in Bandung District in 2004 was actually a progressive step in institutionalizing active political involvement of local people. However, it has not been effectively implemented yet. Lack of political will on the part of local to consistently implement the regulation has ensured that it has had only rhetorical value. The claim that popular participation has been channeled through the annual development planning process is specious, since the process is actually still strongly dominated by local government officers.New arrangements in local governance based on Law No. 32 have in fact significantly reduced the power of DPRDs vis--vis heads of regions, since the former no longer have the power to elect and to hold the latter accountable, as regulated in the previous decentralization law. The head of region is now accountable to the central authorities with the president at the apex of the hierarchy. Thus, from a representative democracy point of view, there has been a significant retreat as well.Thus, the lesson seems to be that decentralization in Indonesia has been pursu ed mainly as a political strategy to fulfill certain political ends, particularly those of national elites within the context of political and economic crisis. Deepening democracy has never been the driving force behind decentralization reform. It is therefore no surprise that we find a lack of political will to realize the democratic potential of decentralization policies at any stage of Indonesias history. Smoke (2003 12) points out that among the most ubiquitous claims regarding impediments to decentralizations success is the lack of strong political will from various stakeholders involved in the process. Theorists do not all mean the same thing when they talk about political will. For some theorists, strong political will can be seen from the existence of constitutional or legal instruments made by political elites, both national and local (Rondinelli, McCullough Johnson 1989 77-78 Smoke 2003 12). Nevertheless, since many cases also show that decentralization policies cannot at tain their intended goals,2 theorists also emphasize that constitutional and legal instruments are not sufficient to ensure workable decentralization policies. As Isaac (2001 9) firmly argues,Fundamental reforms cannot be merely legislated. Legislation remains empty phrases unless powerful movements oversee their implementation. Legislation is necessary but not sufficient for decentralization.Accordingly, as Rondinelli (1983 198-200) highlights, political will must also be measured from the actual realization of those normative arrangements particularly by central political authorities transferring planning, decision-making and managerial authority to lower levels of governments, and also by local political authorities sharing their authority with local citizens through opening up effective channels for political participation so that local citizens, especially the poor and marginalized ones, are able to express their needs and demands and to press claims or national and local devel opment resources. Thus, this dimension of political will is also essential, since in many cases, normative arrangements of decentralization are often used to facilitate political aims that have little to do with devolving power to lower level of governments and utilizing this power to effectively fulfill local peoples needs and demands. As Crook (2003 85-86) stresses, in some African countries the real goal is often to consolidate power through political parties and local elites, or to deliberately neutralize local ethnic challenges through fragmenting potential local power bases into smaller, weaker, politically insignificant units.Based on the above line of thought, the lack of political will in pursuing the democratic potential of Indonesias decentralization can be viewed from different perspectives. Normatively, even though the embrace of the policy may initially be claimed to be an indispensable strategy to develop a democratic system of government, its subsequent adoption with in constitutions and some existing decentralization laws as well as their operational regulations in the regions so far has never been clear, firm, and consistent. Neither constitutions nor basic legislation and its subsequent operational regulations explicitly note that promoting local democracy is among the intended goals of decentralization programs. During the New Order era, Development Planning (Perencanaan Pembangunan), which was regulated within the Ministry of Home Affairs Regulation of 1982 (Permendagri No. 9/1982), was claimed to be adopting a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches. Empirically, however, as proven in the experiences of Bandung District and City of Cirebon, the planning process was actually highly centralized and practically excluded public participation. The local governments development planning processes were nothing but breaking down the centrally planned parameters.One might find that this was not the case during the post-Suharto era, particu larly with regard to Law No.22 of 1999 and Law No. 32 of 2004. Indeed, some argue that Law No. 22 in particular, was intended to promote local democracy and participation, as evident in its preamble in the implementation of Regional Autonomy is deemed to be necessary to emphasize more the principles of democracy, public participation, equal distribution and fairness, and considering the potential and regional diversity (Turner et al. 2003 23 see also, Jaya Dick 2001 216). However, it appears that further details on how local democracy would be implemented on the ground were actually ill-defined.The national government in fact issued a separate regulation, i.e. Government Regulation No. 68 of 1999 regarding public participation in the governmental process.3 From the title of the regulation, one might easily assume that it was regarding peoples involvement in the governments policy-making process. But, it was actually not. The regulation was actually more about peoples rights rather than facilitating popular participation. Four rights were mentioned the right to obtain and give information regarding governmental process the right to get fair service from the government the right to give advice to the government policies and the right to legal protection (perlindungan hukum).4 Thus, the Government Regulation did not specifically mention that popular participation would be the essential component of the government policy-making process. In addition, knowing that popular participation was framed in terms of rights, it means that it was set on voluntary basis. I believe that such setting provided weak encouragement for the public to be engaged in governmental process.In the case of Law No. 32, its prologue reads,local government, which manages and oversees its own governmental affairs based on the principles of decentralization and medebewind (co-operating administration) , is directed towards boosting people welfare through service improvement, empowerment, and po pular participation, as well as improving regional competitiveness by taking into account the principles of democracy, equal distribution, fairness, specialness (keistimewaan), and specific characteristics (kekhususan) of a region within the system of Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia.From the above prologue, there would appear to be no significant difference between Law No. 22 and Law No. 32. However, one might argue that central government, as the main architect of the law, showed stronger political will to uphold local democracy in Law No. 32 rather than its predecessor, based on two novel articles within the law, i.e. Article 56 (1) regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government and Article 139 (1) which stated that Local community has the right to provide input verbally or in writing for the preparation of or during the deliberation of a proposed bill. Direct election of head and deputy head of local government is undeniably desirable since, as P eterson (1997 14) argues, indirect elections have tended to perpetuate the strength of political insiders, who are often more accountable to their party hierarchy than to the public at large. Nevertheless, further analysis of other articles reveals that direct election of head and deputy head of local government actually lacked democratic orientation in three aspects first, the election process was practically dominated by political parties maneuvers, especially during the selection of the candidates for head and deputy head of local government, which is prone to power abuse by selling the office to the highest bidder second, there was strong intervention from national political party boards in determining the candidates and third, the election gave no opportunity for independent candidates (Legowo Djadijono n.d). Hence, in the end, local communities have become the last component in the whole series of the election process. In other words, the novel provisions regarding the direct election of head and deputy head of local government only left the local community marginalized.More importantly, direct election is insufficient for developing strong local democracy since elections occur infrequently and allow for only limited citizen input or feedback regarding specific local concerns or policy options (Posner 2004 57). Strong local democracy, Posner argues, needs to be backed up by active political participation of local constituencies beyond the mere act of voting.With regard to Article 139 (1), it appears that popular participation was provided for on a voluntarily basis. What I am pointing out here is that the article indicates that popular participation in local policy making process was not an essential factor in the process. This point is underlined by the fact that there were no other provisions within Law No. 32 which obligated local government institutions to engage the local community meaningfully in the process.